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Foreword 
This report is a welcome contribution to the urgent and ongoing debate around how to support our 
pressurised adult social care sector, so that it can support our rapidly ageing society. 
 
In December 2015, the International Longevity Centre – UK (ILC-UK) estimated that approximately 
1.86 million people over the age of 50 in England have unmet care needs. At the same time, we 
know that the adult social care sector will continue to face ever increasing demand, as the number 
of people aged over 80 is expected to double in size to over 5 million by 2037. 
 
With the recommendations on funding care set out in the Dilnot report postponed until at least 2020, 
this report proposes an alternative method of means testing social care. Its formula does not require 
capital limits to be imposed, does not unfairly benefit those with greater asset wealth than income 
wealth, and questions the need for a cap on care costs. In doing so it aims to simplify the 
assessment process to the point at which people can have clearer understanding of how funding 
works and the support they can expect, as well as encouraging better financial planning. 
 
Most importantly, this report seeks to promote a formula that is designed to incentivise saving for 
care, and to ensure a fair and sustainable funding settlement for both the individual and the social 
care sector.  
 
At a time the CQC has described as a ‘tipping point’ for the social care sector, the suggestions 
contained in this report make an important contribution to a debate that can no longer be postponed. 
 
With the implementation of the government’s proposed funding mechanism delayed until 2020 due 
to fiscal reservations, the recommendations made in this innovative report should be very carefully 
considered as a matter of urgency. 
 
Baroness Sally Greengross OBE 
Chief Executive, International Longevity Centre – UK 
Co-President, International Longevity Centre Global Alliance 
	
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ................................................................................... 5 	
Means testing adult social care in England ............................................ 6 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 6 
2. Present system for means testing social care ……………………….10 
3. Preferred means test………………………………………………………13 
4. Interfacing means testing with care savings products……………. 24 
5. Concluding Reflections………………………………………………….. 28 
References……………………………………………………………………. 31 
ANNEX A - A family of means testing formulae…..……………………. 33 
ANNEX B - Asset depletion rates…………………………………………. 36 
 
	
	
	5	
	
Executive Summary 
With the number of UK citizens aged 75+ doubling to 10m by 2040, social care funding remains a 
key public policy challenge. The Care Act 2014 included reforms designed to get social care funding 
onto a sustainable footing, by establishing a new level for what individuals and the state will pay in 
England. However, the Government has postponed its introduction until 2020 amid concerns about 
cost. This paper uses the delay to investigate the current and proposed method of means testing 
individuals and finds fault with both. It proposes an alternative formula called the ‘preferred formula’ 
which it argues is fairer and does not require capital limits.  It suggests that the proposed life-time 
cap care costs could also be unnecessary since the preferred formula contains a mechanism that 
automatically limits asset depletion. Using examples, the research tackles a major problem with all 
means testing which is that it dis-incentivises saving and so prevents more money entering the care 
system. An annex finds that the proposed and preferred formulae are part of a wider family of 
means testing formulae that take into account both income and assets.  
.  
Key words: Social and long-term care - Demographic ageing – State support – Means testing   
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Means testing adult social care in England  
1. Introduction 
How best to fund adult social care remains both topical and controversial, especially following the 
Government decision to postpone the implementation proposed new funding arrangements until 
2020 amid concerns about cost.  This research calls for a simplified  approach to means testing 
which would still be linked to a person’s ability to pay, but it would include incentives to set aside 
money for care in the knowledge that it would not be simply taken away by a equivalent reduction in 
state support. The paper deals specifically with the care system in England contained in the Care 
Act (2014).1 Devolved systems in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland, although essentially based 
on the same principles as in England, contain important differences. However, a detailed discussion 
of their arrangements is beyond the scope of this paper.2,3,4 
Means testing is a form of insurance or ‘safety net’ providing financial assistance or a financial 
waiver to people whose income falls below some norm or standard which is applied to many areas 
of public spending. These include eligibility for free or subsidised goods or services, such as 
medical prescriptions, school meals, help with tuition fees, social housing and many others (National 
Audit Office, 2011). The main alternatives to means testing are universal provision, such as the 
National Health Service or social or private insurance.  This paper does not challenge the 
fundamental principle of means testing but argues that there is a better way than the current 
proposal to replace the present system. 5 
It reviews the current and proposed approaches to providing financial support for social care. It goes 
on to suggest a different way of treating income and assets more logically and fairly and in doing so 
it replaces a complex jumble of limits and thresholds. Although technical details are similar, it will be 
argued that the principles underpinning the preferred method are easier to grasp with fewer 
administrative costs.  Using worked examples the paper proposes ways in which savers could be 
rewarded without necessarily losing all of their entitlement to state support. It is further argued that 
its effect will be to bring in much needed new money into an increasingly cash-starved system.  
1.1 Social care in an ageing society 
Unfortunately terminology can vary between countries. In this paper the term ‘social care’ is used an 
umbrella term that includes all forms of formal and informal care and subsumes long-term care 
which usually refers to care provided in a residential or nursing home. Our focus is on the mainly 
retired population aged 65+ rather than on younger adults with care needs who are least likely to be 
able to fund themselves. These groups who have led normal working lives will have accumulated 
wealth and pension entitlements and so are expected to make a contribution towards their care 
needs in future years.  
																																								 																				
1 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents/enacted/data.htm 
2 Northern Ireland: https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/paying-your-residential-care-or-nursing-home-fees 
3 Wales: http://gov.wales/topics/health/socialcare/care/?lang=en 
4 Scotland: http://gov.wales/topics/health/socialcare/care/?lang=en  
5 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/23/contents/enacted/data.htm 
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The problem of how to pay for social care has been revisited many times in recent decades, but the 
passing of the Care Act (2014) is generally reckoned to be an important milestone in this process. 
Nobody can doubt the urgency for reform.  With the number of UK citizens aged 75+ doubling to 
10m by 2040, and with 1.3 million people already receiving social care services in England alone, 
the demand for long-term care is expected to increase significantly in coming decades (Appleby, 
2013; Mayhew et al, 2010; Wittenburg et al, 2008 a and b; Karlsson et al, 2007; Forder, 2007; 
Karlsson et al, 2006 a and b).   
Responsibility for providing care is split between the individual and the state with the state acting as 
a provider of last resort. By making care free or fully privatised either taxes or out of pocket costs 
could sky rocket and so state support needs to be carefully calibrated to avoid either from 
happening.  However, it is chance what kind of care will be required in later life and so it is both 
difficult and expensive to protect against.  For example, it could range from a few days spent at 
home to years spent in residential or nursing care and so it is difficult to predict or quantify.  
The problem is also a major policy issue in other ageing societies but often from different 
perspectives (e.g. see OECD, 2011; Pickard et al, 2007; Costa-i-Font et al, 2008; Karlsson, 2007; 
Comas-Herrera, 2006). Helping those in greatest need and least able to support themselves is 
especially ingrained into the UK welfare system but also so is self-reliance (Kings Fund, 2014; 
Colombo, 2011; Poole, 2006; Wanless, 2006; HMSO, 1999). 6 Although Karlsson et al (2007) 
showed that the UK has one of the lowest cost systems of social care among its economic peers, 
this could be construed in two ways: (a) it is underfunded or (b) it is highly efficient.  This research 
thinks that (a) rather than (b) applies because of the way means testing works in practice.   
1.2 Recent reforms  
In England, some important decisions have already been taken about the future of social care 
following the passing of the Care Act.  This has placed new duties on municipalities (i.e. Local 
Authorities) to undertake entirely separate individual care and financial means assessments.  Before 
the Care Act needs assessments were based on the Fair Access to Care System (FACs) in which 
there were four bands – critical, substantial, moderate and low.7 This allowed for an element of 
discretion as to whether a local authority would fund care needs or not depending on which band 
they were in.   
Under the Care Act, FACs has been replaced a national minimum eligibility threshold broadly 
equivalent to ‘substantial’ alongside a new system of funding and charging (SCIE, 2015). This would 
remove one of the idiosyncrasies of the present system resulting from local discretion in which one 
municipality may grant eligibility for financial support and another not. Under the new arrangements 
local authorities must carry out an assessment of anyone who appears to require care and support, 
regardless of their likely eligibility for state-funded care.  Once the needs assessment is complete a 
financial assessment is made, known as a ‘means test’, to see if a user qualifies for state financial 
support.   
																																								 																				
6 See also Ready for Ageing? - Select Committee on Public Service and Demographic Change (2013). 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/public-services-committee/report-ready-for-ageing/   
7 See SCIE, ‘Fair access to care services (FACS): prioritising eligibility for care and support’, and, Social Care Institute for Excellence, 
www.scie.org.uk/publications/guides/guide33/changing-scene/eligibility-criteria.asp (accessed 12 Feb 2014) 
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Implementation of the new system of state financial support which includes changes to the capital 
limits has been delayed to 2020 and so eligibility under the present system remains as it has been 
for the time being.  If a user has assets over £23,250 they are assessed as being able to meet the 
full cost of their care but if they are below £14,250 they are protected. For capital between these two 
limits a contribution of £1 per week for every £250 of capital is required. This is termed ‘tariff income’ 
in the regulations and is meant to represent the amount that an individual should be able to 
contribute from their own resources aside from their usual income. 
Under the proposed system there will be a life-time cap on care costs. Everyone with eligible needs 
will have a care account that will record their progress towards the cap and once reached future 
care costs would be met by the state.  After due consideration, the Government set the ‘life-time 
cap’ at £72,000 which would then rise in line with inflation. Whether care is provided in the user’s 
home or in residential care, only the rate set by the municipality will count towards the cap. Note that 
the cap does not cover daily living costs which could more than double the outlay, although these 
costs would normally be incurred anyway (Kenny et al, 2016). The rationale for the cap is twofold: 
firstly to avoid some people incurring what the Commission on Funding Care and Support termed as 
‘catastrophic care costs’ and secondly to make it simpler for insurance companies to introduce 
insurance policies which would provide protection up to the cap.8  
To give an example, if the care cost element is say £12,000 p.a., then a person would need to be in 
care for six years for it to be triggered. This is higher than typical durations of care in residential 
settings, so it only provides protection for those with assets above this level. If they are cared for at 
home and their care needs are fewer, the time taken to reach the cap will be correspondingly 
greater and therefore its effect would be arguably nugatory. 9,10 It is worth noting that the 
Commission on Funding Care and Support recommended a cap of £35,000 rather than £72,000 
which would have allayed this tendency. However, it is argued that the cap will at least give certainty 
and peace of mind to the maximum of how much people will be asked to pay towards their care.  
The problem is that the cap is not particularly easy to implement because it requires new 
administrative machinery to monitor individual care accounts.  In addition, the hoped-development 
of insurance products has not happened in practice. Questions remain over how the cap will work 
as care needs change over time requiring case reviews and re-assessments. The Act also creates a 
requirement to provide assessments to people that would not have been eligible for state support 
because they were self-funders, so increasing the scope and coverage of the new system. In this 
paper we therefore ask the question whether the cap serves any practical purpose given the 
administrative overheads involved, the fact that many will never reach it in their life-times, and that 
no insurance market has emerged. 
																																								 																				
8 Dilnot A (chair), Fairer Care Funding: The report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support, 2011, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130221130239/https://www.wp.dh.gov.uk/carecommission/files/2011/07/Fairer-Care-Funding-Report.pdf 
(accessed 12 Feb 2014). 
 
9 Note that a different system operates in Scotland. Free personal and nursing care is available for everyone aged 65 and over who have received an 
assessment. 
 
10 In more limited circumstances, care may be provided completely free of charge under the so called ‘continuing care system’ provides by the NHS 
but we do not discuss this further here.	
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Means testing under the proposed system will be similarly based on the present system, i.e. taking 
both assets and income into account. The key difference with the present system is changes to the 
capital limits. The Government has proposed a new upper limit of £118,000 and a limit of £27,000 
for people where the value of their home is disregarded (e.g. for domiciliary care or where the 
spouse continues to live in the home). The new lower capital limit is £17,000 (previously £14,250) is 
designed to protect some of a person’s assets.  Whilst the new limits are plainly more generous, 
they are also arguably more complicated to administer (for example, independent asset valuations 
may be required).  However, it is not our intention in this paper to enter into the detail about the 
types of asset definitions covered by the proposed system and which qualify or not.   
Suffice it to say that for most people their home is the most important asset.  Indeed, a key aim of 
the Dilnot Commission was to consider how homes could be better protected. A home is not 
counted as capital if certain people still live there such as a husband, wife, civil partner, close 
relative or carer. Neither is it counted as capital if care is being delivered to a person in their own 
home. In certain circumstances the home must be sold to pay for care, although under new 
arrangements repayment of care fees can be postponed until after death.  Detailed rules for the 
treatment of different kinds of assets including investment bonds with a life insurance component,  
their beneficial ownership and rules governing the definition and treatment of income other than 
earnings may be found in CRAG and are not discussed further here.11,12 
1.3 Aims of the paper 
As far as financial assessments are concerned, there are several unresolved problems with the 
proposed system which are carried forward from the present system. One is a common perception 
that care costs, like healthcare, are provided for free and so it would be a waste of money to save 
for something the Government will pay for anyway. This belief is reinforced because for people with 
higher incomes find that their support is taken away on a pound for pound basis. A wider 
consequence of this effect is that the flow of much needed new money into the social care system is 
arguably undermined as a result.   
Although difficult to avoid in practice, the complexity of the test is also unhelpful. Arbitrary thresholds 
in the system create perverse incentives for people to spend down assets so that they are inside the 
relevant boundaries for financial support. Many also find the terminology is confusing – for example 
the use of the word ‘tariff’ to impute a notional income on assets is easily confused with everyday 
usage as a ‘pricelist’ or tax on goods. In this paper we use the word ‘tariff’ to mean the nationally 
recommended cost of a particular care package rather than as a kind of ‘tax’. There is no exact 
equivalent of a tariff in the current system because arrangements are negotiated locally with 
providers. We use the word ‘taper’, to describe how financial support is withdrawn as income 
increases (i.e. similar to usage in the UK tax and benefit system).   
 We will not be concerned here with the wider question of how the formula should operate, although 
it is important that financial assessments are undertaken as quickly as possible and support the 
																																								 																				
11 Department of Health (2014) Charging for Residential Accommodation Guide (CRAG): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/301250/CRAG_34_April_2014.pdf 
 
12 See Factsheet 10 ‘ Paying for permanent residential ‘ care published by Age UK in August 2015, which has 60 pages  
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case for a respite before care charges are levied as for example would apply in the case of 
intermediate care.13  This would have the beneficial effect of allowing preventive action to be taken 
in cases that would otherwise lead to an avoidable hospital admission or to accelerate transfer into 
residential care following a spell in hospital once a person’s condition is stabilised (Mayhew and 
Lawrence, 2006; Mayhew, 2009).  
 With this in mind, the aims of this paper are to present and evaluate different methods of means 
testing, in particular how to: 
• Create a means test that can be used both for domiciliary and institutional care with equal clarity 
• Make the system fairer and more transparent e.g. by removing ‘cliff edges’ which cause perverse 
behaviours such as the deliberate disposal of assets 
• Treat people with similar personal wealth but split differently in terms of income and assets 
equitably and fairly  
• Simplify the rules so that anybody could reasonably be expected to undertake their own 
assessment with minimal financial expertise or using the internet   
• Bring new money into the system, primarily private, from individuals and not the state by 
providing the appropriate incentives to save.  
In the following sections we provide an overview of the present and proposed means testing system 
and signpost wherein lie the main problems. We then describe and evaluate a new formula for 
means testing which we compare with the proposed system and highlight important differences. 
Thirdly, we subject both the new and proposed formula to different scenarios to show how much it 
would cost and what entitlements would be over a typical care cycle. In doing so, we support this 
with stylised but realistic examples involving both residential and domiciliary care. A further section 
considers the role of financial incentives to encourage people to save for care. 
 
2. Present system for means testing social care  
Under the current system, Local authorities must offer each user a choice of at least one care home 
that is affordable but also to be able to choose alternatives including more expensive 
accommodation e.g. where a third party contributes towards the cost.14 The amount a person pays 
towards the cost will depend on their capital and income. If assets are over £23,250 they are 
assessed as being able to meet the full cost of their care and so receive nothing. If it is between 
£14,250, the lower limit, and £23,250 this is considered as providing a person with £1 a week for 
every £250 of their capital. This equates to a person’s assets x 52/250 p.a. or equivalently assets x 
0.208.  
If a person is in a residential institution they are allowed to keep £24.40 a week of their income for 
personal use (i.e. £1,268.80 p.a.). Later, we will assume that the personal allowance has been 
																																								 																				
13 A more radical proposal could be to separate means testing from care needs assessments e.g. as part of the tax system. 
 
14 Care and Support Statutory Guidance issued under the Care Act 2014, para. 8.33. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315993/Care-Act-Guidance.pdf 
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netted off income in order to simplify the exposition, although its retention is implicit in all that 
follows. According to the Care Act a person must be offered at least one care home by the 
municipality and that ideally three should be offered.  For the sake of example, let us suppose that 
fees in the preferred care home are £25,000 p.a.  and that this is £5,000 more than the municipal 
standard rate or care tariff for this type of care. Table 1 shows how the current system works for four 
people with different means.  
Case A has savings of less than £14,250 and so there is no imputed income; Case A pays 
£3,731.20 and receives £16,268.80.  Case B has savings of £20,000 which is between the lower 
and up capital limits and so is assessed as having an imputed income of £1,196 p.a.; B pays 
£14,927.20 and receives £5,072.80 from the municipality. Both A and B must also make a top up 
payment to cover the difference between the tariff and care home fee.  
Here, the top-up cost is often met by the person’s family (or other third party) and not by the user 
who is required to spend almost all of their income on the user charge. Cases C and D receive no 
contribution at all because C’s income minus the personal income allowance exceeds the care tariff 
and D because their savings are greater than the capital limit. Cases C and D are hence deemed to 
be ‘self-funders’. 
 
Line Basis for assessment A B C D 
1 Care home fees  25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 
2 Municipal tariff or standard rate 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
3 Income p.a. 5,000 15,000 25,000 15,000 
4 Personal expense allowance 1,268.80 1,268.80(a) 1,268.80 1,268.80 
5 Savings 10,000 20,000 20,000 40,000 
6 Imputed income p.a. 0(f) 1,196(b) n/a n/a 
7 Residents contribution 3,731.20 14,927.20(c) 25,000 25,000 
8 Municipal contribution 16,268.80 5,072.80(d) 0 0 
9 Top up payment  5,000 5,000(e) Self-funding Self-funding 
 
Table 1: How the present systems works with four examples of financial assessments (all figures except  
savings in £s p.a.) 
Explanatory notes to Table 1: (a) Personal expense allowance =52 x weekly allowance of £24.40 = 1,268.80; 
(b) Imputed income p.a. =( savings – lower capital limit)/£250 x 52 = (£20,000 -£14,250)  x 0.208 = £1,196; 
(c)  Income – personal allowance + imputed income=£15,000 - £1268.80 + £1,196 = £14, 927.20; (d) Tariff – 
resident’s contribution = £20,000 - £14,927.20 = £5,072.80; (e) Actual care home fees – Tariff = £25,000 - 
£20,000 = £5,000; (f) There is no imputed income to pay since savings are below £14,250 
In the case of domiciliary care financial arrangements can vary enormously between municipalities 
and are not discussed here. However, in a worked example later we show how a revised formula 
could work in domiciliary as well as residential settings. By any yardstick this is a complicated 
process with several arbitrary features: firstly the ‘cliff edge’ such that if a person’s assets exceed 
the £23,250 limit, state assistance is zero; second the arbitrary value of imputed income based on 
£1 pound per week for each £250 of assets that fall between two arbitrary limits. Combined these 
rules significantly reduce any incentive to save for care or to set assets aside particularly for those 
at or near the £23,250 asset limit which become a psychological barrier as a result. 
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Inevitably there will be some ‘gaming’ of the system – i.e. to stay below the prescribed upper capital 
limit. Clearly, the bigger the ‘cliff edge’ the more gaming will occur.  In practice this is effectively 
tolerated as long as the amounts are small (e.g. a person divests themselves of say £1,000 worth of 
savings to get below the upper capital limit). If on the other hand, a person intentionally gifts their 
home shortly before they enter care, the system calls this a ‘deliberate deprivation of assets’ and for 
assessment purposes the person would be treated as still owning the asset.  
 
2.1 Proposed means test 
In case of any doubt about how the current test is viewed, Andrew Dilnot who led the Commission 
on funding social care described it as the ‘most stupid and worst means test that we have’. 15 In its 
report the Commission proposed changes to the system that would eliminate this cliff edge by 
altering the capital limits to make the transition to self-funding smoother. As previously noted, the 
Government has since proposed a new upper limit of £118,000 and a limit of £27,000 for those 
receiving domiciliary care or where the spouse continues to live in the house. The new lower capital 
limit is £17,000 (previously £14,250).  However, as previously stated, the introduction of the new 
arrangements, including the cap, has been postponed until 2020 because of concerns about 
costs.16 
It is evident that the proposed means test is more generous than previously and also more gradual 
in its effect.  This may be seen in Figure 1 which shows the means test boundary for assets ranging 
from £0 to £118,000 instead of £23,250 previously for the case of a person in residential care who 
has not reached the cap. For the purposes of this chart, ‘care tariff’ is assumed to be £25,000 p.a. 
as previously, including both care and accommodation costs. We call the area labelled A the 
entitlement zone for state support and B the self-funding zone. For example, a person with no 
assets but an income of £25,000 would not receive any support and similarly a person with assets 
above £118,000.   
Income from assets is imputed on the same basis as in the present system i.e. £1 pound per week 
for each £250 of assets above the lower limit of £17,000. For reasons previously stated, we call this 
imputation factor a ‘taper’ rather than a ‘tariff income’ as it is still known. Note that a different taper 
would result in a smaller or larger entitlement zone but never exceeding assets of £118,000 or an 
income which is greater than the tariff. The entitlement formula is given below. As can be seen it 
retains similar features to the present system, including the computation for imputed income.   
State support p.a. = Care tariff – (income net of personal allowance + imputed income), 
where  
Care tariff = standard rate for residential care including living costs 
Imputed income p.a. = (capital – minus the lower capital limit) x 52/250 (or 0.208)  
																																								 																				
15 Andrew Dilnot made this statement in his presentation at a meeting held at the Kings Fund, London on 20th September 2011. 
16 Letter from Alistair Burt, the then care minister, to the Local Government Association, 17th July 2015: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/446309/Cap_on_care_acc.pdf 
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Because it tries to do more, the proposed means test is arguably more complicated. Also, the limits 
themselves remain arbitrary with no particular rationale other than to protect public expenditure, 
which is of course important (although it is true that the upper limit is close in size to half the 
average property value of a home). There are two abrupt changes of direction in zone A - one 
created by the upper capital limit of £118,000 and the other occurring when income is £25,000 
which is caused by the £17,000 lower capital limit. We will argue in the next section that an ‘all-in-
one’ calculation is unencumbered by boundaries and so is less complex. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed means testing entitlement zone for different levels of assets and income  
including upper capital limits for domiciliary and residential care and a lower capital limit 
3. Preferred means test 
Previous sections have explained why the current and proposed means tests remain problematic.  
In this section, we describe a new method of means testing which we call the ‘preferred’ formula. It 
forms one of a family of possible means tests which vary depending on how income and assets are 
treated and includes the proposed test of the previous section as one of the cases (see Annex A). 
Below, we describe how the ‘preferred’ variant works, illustrating its operation with worked 
examples. 
Consider to begin with a care home with a tariff of £25,000 p.a. which includes both care and 
accommodation costs. The notional number of years a person with £50,000 in assets and an 
income of £15,000 p.a. (i.e. person D) could afford to pay for their care is £50,000/ (£25,000 - 
£15,000) i.e. five years before their capital is depleted. Annex A shows that the concept of 
affordable years is actually common to all means testing variants although it has never been 
presented in this way before.   
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From the state’s viewpoint, those who can afford more years of care receive less public support and 
vice versa. As with the current system, it means that if an individual selects a care home that is 
costlier than the tariff then the top up costs should come from a third party such as a relative.  If a 
person’s income equals or exceeds the tariff that person is deemed able to pay all care costs out of 
income alone. If care is not sustainable on income alone then assets will deplete over time and so 
how this operates becomes a key issue.   
If their income is less than the tariff then individuals will be obliged to spend down their assets by an 
amount given in the formula below.  Because the tariff sets an upper limit on what can or cannot be 
funded, there is arguably no need for an upper asset limit since funding is limited by the care 
package being provided and not by what care homes actually charge.   
The formula is given by: 
Years of care afforded = Assets/ (£25,000 – annual income) 
The amount of support a person receives is given by: 
State support = (1 − Taper × Years afforded) × Tariff 
The taper varies between 0 and 1 such that the lower the taper, the more state support is provided. 
Note that what value the taper is set at is a policy issue and not a statistical artefact of the formula. 
For comparability with the proposed means test we choose a factor of 0.2 which essentially replaces 
the factor 0.208 in the current and proposed test.  Application of the formula is undertaken annually 
to ensure that the eligibility and levels of support provided are regularly updated to deal with 
changes of circumstances.   
Continuing with the previous example, the amount a person must pay toward their care in this case 
is £25,000 × 0.2 × years afforded. In the formula, state support becomes zero when the term inside 
the brackets is zero or less from which we can derive an upper asset limit that is linked to the tariff.  
If the level of support exceeds the difference between the tariff and income, the formula defaults to 
the lower of the two figures (i.e. the difference between the tariff and a person’s income). This 
ensures that no-one will receive more than the tariff.    
Another way to think about the formula is given in Figure 2 which bands people according to the 
number of care years afforded. Those in band A can afford up to one year, B, between one and two 
years, C, between two and three years, D, between three  and four years and E, between four and 
five years. Band A would receive between 80 and 100 per cent of their care costs, B 60 to 80 per 
cent, C 40 to 60 per cent, D 20 to 40 per cent, and E 0 to 20 per cent.  It follows from the formula 
that anyone with income at or above the tariff is deemed to be a ‘self-funder’ because they can 
‘afford’ more than five years’ worth of care from their income and assets.  
It also can be deduced that in the theoretical case of a person having no income they would be 
eligible for  financial support as long as their assets are £125,000 or less (i.e. 5 years of care at 
25,000 p.a.). For taper values of 0.10, 0.15, 0.25, say, upper asset limits would be £250,000, 
£166,667 and £100,000, in which case state support only kicks in if affordable years are less than 
10, 6.67 or 4 years, this limit being given by one divided by the taper (e.g. 1/0.25 =4 years).  For 
comparison, the taper in the proposed system 0.208 yields an upper limit of £120,192 (equating to 
4.81 years) at this tariff which is only slightly higher than the proposed upper eligibility limited for 
funding. 
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Figure 2: Preferred means test showing the levels of support for different care years afforded based on  
funding bands A to E (see text) 
 
3.1 Who is likely to benefit from state support? 
Figure 3 is a contour map showing the distribution of wealth in the 65+ population based income 
and assets including housing using data from ELSA.17 Contours represent actual concentrations of 
the 65+ population with different levels of income and capital.  By age 65, most will have retired and 
so their incomes will generally be lower than in pre-retirement.  It can be seen that income is 
concentrated in the £7k to £15k range, with a modal value of approximately £11,000 p.a. This is 
made up from a combination of the state pension, any occupational pension entitlement, plus other 
sources including welfare benefits.   
The distribution of asset values shows a completely different pattern to income; it is bi-modal (i.e. it 
has two peaks) and ranges from nothing to very substantial amounts (assets above £250,000 are 
not shown). 18  Two particular asset concentrations are observed – one, very dense, near the x-axis 
centred on incomes of £11,000 p.a. with assets of under £25,000, and another, centred on the same 
income, with assets of £100,000.  This is because the second concentration is home owners and 
the first is not. Note that assets refer to individuals rather than couple households so that the value 
of jointly owned assets such as a home is divided equally in these cases. 
																																								 																				
17 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing: http://www.elsa-project.ac.uk/(accessed 12 Feb 2014). For couple households housing assets are divided 
equally.  
18 Note that net negative assets are also possible e.g. as a result of outstanding mortgage debt, although this is a relatively rare occurrence in this age 
group.	
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Figure 3: Simplified means test with contours showing concentrations of wealth in the 65+ population.  
Assets include housing which is pro-rated according to ownership 
The line sloping from left to right is the preferred means test boundary for state support based on a 
tariff of £25,000 and a taper of 0.2 which may be compared with the very crooked boundary shown 
in Figure 1. This follows directly from the preferred formula for state support in the previous section 
which is zero when the taper x years afforded equals one.  It cuts the y-axis when assets are worth 
£125,000 and income is zero and the x-axis when assets are zero and annual income is £25,000. 
Those located in area A qualify for state support and so are in the entitlement zone and those in 
area B are self-funders.   
Of the approximate 10m people aged 65+ in England, roughly 2.7m people fall into category A and 
7.3m in category B before entering care. A comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 1 shows that 
entitlement zones are similar in size but there are now no cliff-edges or boundary interruptions. Less 
expensive tariffs produce a smaller, nested set of parallel entitlement areas; since the tariff in this 
example is roughly what it would be for residential care, it will be among the highest.  If the tariff 
were, say, £20,000 and not £25,000, it would cut the vertical axis when assets are £100,000 and the 
horizontal access i.e. income at £20,000. 
Our approach envisages that care tariffs would be graded according to need and includes an 
assessment for living costs as well as care. It is assumed that living costs for those receiving care at 
home would be informed by levels set in the social security benefits system. The tariff for entering a 
care home would be higher than for care provided in a person’s home and would be divided into 
care and living costs as now. The highest tariffs would be reserved for people with the greatest 
needs and with other special circumstances such as dementia.   
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Figure 4: Implied state support based on a tariff of 25,000 and a taper of 0.2 for different levels of assets  
and income using the preferred formula 
 
3.2 Changes in financial circumstances and variations in levels of support 
Figure 4 shows how support under the preferred formula varies in the eligibility range, which is given 
by the hatched line in the bottom left corner based on a tariff of £25,000 and a taper of 0.2. It shows 
that a person with no income or assets would receive £25,000 i.e. the maximum permitted; a person 
with £5,000 of income and no assets, £20,000 and so on.  This taper provides some state support 
for anyone that has assets below £125,000 with no income and for anyone with no assets but an 
income of less than £25,000.  
It is important for personal financial planning purposes to show how state support would alter if there 
is a change of circumstance, for example a fall/rise in income or a fall/rise in assets. Income is more 
likely to remain unaltered than assets, although there may be opportunities to annuitize an asset or 
for assets to deplete over time in order to pay for care costs.  From the formula we can see that 
state support will change if either assets increase/decrease or income increases/decreases or if 
there was a change in the tariff. This will depend on in the number of years afforded; if these go up 
state support declines and vice versa. 
The change is calculated by the following formula which will generally apply so long as income is 
less than the tariff and provided support does not exceed the gap between the tariff and income.   
Change = - Taper x Tariff x change in number of years afforded 
£250,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£225,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£200,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£175,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£150,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£125,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£100,000 £5,000 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£75,000 £10,000 £6,250 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
£50,000 £15,000 £12,500 £8,333 £0 £0 £0 £0
£25,000 £20,000 £18,750 £15,000 £10,000 £0 £0 £0
£0 £25,000 £20,000 £15,000 £10,000 £5,000 £0 £0
£0 £5,000 £10,000 £15,000 £20,000 £25,000 £30,000
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The percentage change is given by 100
)1(
×
−
Δ−
pY
Yp , where YΔ 	is the change in the number of years 
afforded, Y is the initial years afforded and p is the taper.  
In other words, the change in support is equal to minus the taper times the tariff times the change in 
affordable years. To give two examples: (a) if Y  increases by one year from 2 to 3 the level of 
support would fall by -0.2 x 1/ (1- 0.2 x 2) x 100 = -33.3%; (b) if Y  falls from 3 to 2 years the level of 
support would increase by -0.2 x -1/ (1-0.2 x 3) x 100 = 50.0%. Other examples may be readily 
calculated. 
 
3.3 Equivalence of assets and income for a given tariff 
A general principle is that income and assets should serve a common purpose and be regarded as 
interchangeable as far as paying for care is concerned. However, a system of financial support in 
which assets receive more favourable treatment than income will tend to favour those whose wealth 
is skewed towards assets. The reason why this is important is that not only is it unfair, but it will 
increase the effect of people seeking to gain an advantage on the state by shifting wealth between 
income and assets.  
It is not possible to show strict equivalence based on trading assets for income since levels of 
support depend on the number of years of care afforded and also the tariff.  However, it is possible 
to compare Individuals with equivalent care needs but also wealth in terms what their state support 
would be under the preferred and proposed methods. Table 2 gives three examples which compare 
state support at the point of assessment based on a tariff of £25.000. Each person has a different 
mix of assets and income but each is notionally able to fund the same affordable number of years of 
care. In the preferred example the taper is set at 0.2 and in the proposed case 0.208. 
Consider each person in turn. A has £66,667 of savings and £5,000 income p.a. Applying the 
preferred formula, person A can notionally afford 3.33 years of care (£66,667/ (£25,000-£5,000) = 
3.33).  Person B, with £50,000 of savings and £10,000 income p.a., can also afford 3.33 years of 
care (£50,000/(£25,000-£10,000) = 3.33); Person C with £33,333 of savings and £15,000 income 
per annum, can also afford 3.33 years of care (£33,333/(£25,000 - £15,000) = 3.33). Under the 
preferred formula each therefore receives the same level of support, i.e. £8,333 (see second last 
column).  
Under the proposed formula set out in Section 2.1 the levels of support would change. In 
comparison with the preferred case, A receives £9,669, B receives £8,136 and C, who has fewer 
savings than either A or B, gets only £6,603. This difference between the cases is not caused by 
there being a different taper, although that affects the absolute amounts, but the way in which the 
formula works.  Each extra pound of income results in an equivalent reduction in state support but 
each extra pound in assets results only in a 20.80 pence reduction so having more wealth in assets 
than in income becomes advantageous.  
To summarise, assets receive a more generous discount than income, with £3,066 difference in the 
level of financial support between A and C.  The asymmetric treatment of people with the same 
ability to pay for a given package of care thereby creates an anomaly if we are seeking to introduce 
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a system which strikes a fair balance between individuals of similar means faced with the same care 
costs.  The preferred formula gets around this problem. 
 
Person Category 
Amount 
(£) 
Years of 
care 
afforded 
Preferred 
support 
(£) 
Proposed 
support 
(£) 
A Income 5,000 3.33 8,333 9,669 
 
Savings 66,667 
   B Income 10,000 3.33 8,333 8,136
 
Savings 50,000 
   C Income 15,000 3.33 8,333 6,603
 
Savings 33,333 
    
Table 2: The amount of state support delivered by the preferred and proposed Government’s means  
test for three people of equal wealth	based on a tariff of £25,000 (Note: Proposed support includes £17,000 
asset lower limit) 
3.4 How long will financial assets last?  
An important concern to individuals entering into care is what will happen to their assets if their 
income is insufficient to cover the tariff. Under the proposed formula the lower capital limit is 
£17,000; this amount is netted off during initial assessment and is therefore effectively protected 
from future changes in care needs. Each year a person’s eligibility for state support is reassessed 
based on the tariff applying and on a person’s remaining assets and income.  The rate at which 
assets are run down is determined by the taper which in the proposed case is 0.208 or 20.8% p.a , 
as has been already noted,. 
How this works is set out in detail in Annex B (a). The example given is for a person with a 
residential care tariff of £25,000 p.a. of which £12,000 is care costs.  Assuming initial assets of 
£50,000, by the time the cap is reached after 6 years, remaining assets above the lower limit would 
be worth 31% of their original value (or [£50,000 - £17,000] x 0.31 = £10,230). Total remaining 
assets will be £10,283 + £17,000 = £27,283, or 54.6% of £50,000.  
In contrast to the proposed formula, the lower limit in the preferred formula is not a single limit but 
one that depends on individual circumstances including the care tariff as well as a person’s income.  
This makes sense because some people have more of their wealth in income and others in assets; 
in addition, some will have low tariffs and others high ones. In general, these limits are mostly higher 
than under the proposed formula but they do not include the £17,000 which is netted off under the 
proposed formula. How the limits work in the case of the preferred formula and the computational 
details are set out in Annex B (b). 
Limits in these cases do not apply to self-funders outside the entitlement zone, only to those eligible 
for state support. In other words, once their assets are run down sufficiently and state support is 
triggered, so the limit begins to take effect. Note that, this limit is never breached but is approached 
asymptotically over a period of time. As assets are depleted the amount of state support increases 
until it equals the difference between the tariff and income.  Note that if assets are already below the 
asymptotic limit, state support will already be at this level. 
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An example is given in Figure 5. Consider a person with initial assets of £50,000 with an income of 
£10,000. Assume, as before, the same residential tariff of £25,000 but with the preferred taper of 0.2 
instead of 0.208.  The lower capital limit or asymptote under the preferred formula for this person is 
£30,000 based on the formula in Annex B (b) and is based on annual assessment of the years of 
care afforded. Since the limit is independent of the amount of assets a person owns and only 
depends on the tariff, income and taper, the limit is always the same for any level of savings of over 
£30,000. 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
Figure 5: Asymptotic lower capital limit under the preferred formula (see text). Note: Vertical line at year 6 
equates to the £72k cap based on annual care costs of £12,000. Point A indicates assets remaining after	cap	
are	reached				      
Figure 5 also includes a line showing progress towards the £72,000 care cap which takes six years 
to reach (point A). It can be seen that the asymptotic limit of asset depletion is closely approached 
at more or less the same time as it takes to reach the cap. This is generally the case for a wide 
range of realistic examples and so it poses the interesting question of why a cap is needed, an issue 
to which we return in section 5.  
In terms of the kind of limits to expect using the preferred formula, the lower capital limit will range 
from £18,750 to £37,500 based on simulations using a typical range of would-be tariffs. Annex B (b) 
also shows the important result that the lower limit is a maximum when income equals half the tariff. 
The rationale is that people on low incomes but with large savings should be prepared to spend 
down more of their assets than people on average incomes, whilst those on high incomes which are 
nearer to the tariff require less asset protection.  
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A final observation on the use of the preferred formula in practice is its impact on the share of 
spending between the individual and the state over a defined period.  We have seen that more 
assets are used in the first years than subsequently to pay for care after which the state’s share 
increases as is to be expected. In the next section, we bring these considerations together using 
worked examples showing how the share between the state and the individual changes over time in 
the preferred and proposed cases. 
3.4  Worked examples 
Two examples show how the transition from self-funding to state support might function in the first 
six years of care assuming the individual to still be alive based on the preferred formula. The first is 
for a person entering a care home and the second is a person receiving domiciliary care.  The tariff 
in both examples is based on a combined assessment of the person’s care needs and their living 
costs; but note that assessed living costs may differ from their actual living costs if they had 
remained at home.   
To be clear, only the cost of care contributes to the care cap and so a person will continue to be 
liable for their living costs regardless of whether they hit the cap or not. If they are in institutional 
care their assets will comprise their home, savings and any other eligible assets. The home is not 
included if there is a spouse or relative is still living in their home or if the care is being delivered in a 
person’s home instead (see domiciliary example below and earlier discussion on treatment of 
housing assets).  
(a) Institutional example 
Table 3 gives the payment schedule for a hypothetical individual with a valid care assessment which 
entails residential based care in which financial assessments are assumed to be carried out 
annually.  It is designed to show the cost to a typical person who enters a care home and is initially 
self-funding. For the purposes of illustration, we again assume a care home tariff of £25,000 made 
up of £12,000 care costs and £13,000 living costs. To keep the example simple, we further assume 
that care needs are unchanged and hence the tariff does not change over time.    
At the point of entry into the care home the individual has £100,000 worth of assets and £10,000 
p.a. income. Based on the preferred formula, it means that they are able to afford 6.7 years of care 
and so are not entitled to any support in the first year (£100,000/(£25,000-£10,000) = 6.7). Care 
costs counting towards the ‘care cap’ are shown in the final column in which it is seen that the cap is 
reached after six years (6 x £12,000 = £72,000). Although it is not approached in these examples, 
the lower asset limit for this case is £30,000 based on the formula in Annex B (b). 
Column three shows the assets available at the start of the current year and column four shows that 
state support kicks in from year three. By the time the cap is reached t the end of year six, the total 
cost to the state will be £27,901 and to the individual £122,099 (bottom row of table). At the start of 
year seven, the individual has £37,901 of savings remaining based on expenditure up to year six 
(i.e. £41,852 - £13,951 + £10,000 = £37,901). Total expenditure to this point is £150,000 (£27,901 + 
£122,099 = £150,000), £60,000 of which comes from income (40% of the total), £62,099 from 
assets (41%) and £27,901 (19%) from state support.  
  In this time the person moves from being a self-funder to Band C via bands E and D (see 
final column and Figure 2). Note that if the individual is alive and remains in care beyond six years, 
	22	
	
then they are still liable for accommodation costs as these do not count towards the cap, so there 
may be further, smaller depletions of capital later on if living costs exceed income. In this example, 
assessed living costs are £13,000 and income is £10,000 so there would be an ongoing annual gap 
of £3,000. This would be met partly by state support and partly by personal assets until the lower 
asset limit is reached which in this case is £30,000. 
 
 
Year in 
care 
Cumulative 
care 
payments  
(£) 
Assessable 
capital at 
start of 
care year 
(£) 
State 
support 
(£) 
Cost to 
individual 
(£) 
Contribution 
to cap  
(£) 
 
Years of 
care 
afforded 
State 
support 
band 
1 25,000 100,000 0 25,000 12,000 
 
6.7 self-funder 
2 50,000 85,000 0 25,000 24,000 
 
5.7 self-funder 
3 75,000 70,000 1,667 23,333 36,000 
 
4.7 E 
4 100,000 56,667 6,111 18,889 48,000 
 
3.8 D 
5 125,000 47,778 9,074 15,926 60,000 
 
3.2 D 
6 150,000 41,852 11,049 13,951 72,000 
 
2.8 C 
 
Final balance 37,901 27,901 122,099 
     
Table 3: Care cost progression over a six-year cycle for a person in a care home including the depletion of 
assets, state support and out-of-pocket costs	based on a tariff of £25,000 and a lower asset limit of £30,000 
 
 
(b) Domiciliary example 
In this example, the person has savings worth £50,000 and receives care at home.   The cared for 
person maintains control of their income with state support usually being provided as part of an 
itemised integrated care plan or budget. This person has an income of £10,000 p.a. and an 
assessed home care tariff of £18,000 p.a. of which £13,000 is assumed to be living costs. In 
practice, the income needed for daily living will comprise a person’s pension and other sources 
including entitlement to social security benefits. The municipality gives them an itemised personal 
budget over which they or their designated carer has control.  For the first two years of care this 
person is banded as a self-funder and so is ineligible for state support (see final column).   
As in case (a), the level of state support gradually increases as assets decline and they move into 
band E and then D.  At the start of year seven, the individual has £23,300 in assets remaining 
(£24,182 - £10,882 +£10,000 = £23,300).  Total expenditure to this point is £108,000 (£21,300 + 
£86,700 = £108,000), £60,000 of which comes from income (56% of the total), £26,700 from assets 
(25%), and £21,300 (19%) from means tested care support. As care costs accrue at the rate of 
£5,000 p.a. it will take this person 14.4 years to reach the cap assuming no change of tariff. By then 
remaining assets will be very close to their asymptotic lower limit of £22,222.   
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Year in 
care 
Cumulative 
care 
payments  
(£) 
Assessable 
capital at 
start of care 
year  
(£) 
State 
support 
(£) 
Cost to 
individual 
(£) 
Contribution 
to cap (£) 
 
Years of 
care 
afforded 
State 
support 
band 
1 18,000 50,000 0 18,000 5,000 
 
6.3 self-funder 
2 36,000 42,000 0 18,000 10,000 
 
5.3 self-funder 
3 54,000 34,000 2,700 15,300 15,000 
 
4.3 E 
4 72,000 28,700 5,085 12,915 20,000 
 
3.6 D 
5 90,000 25,785 6,397 11,603 25,000 
 
3.2 D 
6 108,000 24,182 7,118 10,882 30,000 
 
3.0 D 
 
Final balance 23,300 21,300 86,700 
     
Table 4: Care cost progression over a six-year cycle for person receiving domiciliary care including the 
depletion of assets, state support and out of pocket costs based on a tariff of £18,000 and a lower asset limit of 
£22,222 
 
 
3.6 Out of pocket and state support costs compared  
A comparative evaluation of the proposed or preferred means tests involves judgements about how 
each performs in the same financial circumstances. This in turn will depend on values given to the 
taper and tariff in the both formulae and to values given to the capital limits in the proposed test.  A 
key difference between the two systems is that there is no mechanism in the proposed formula to 
prevent assets being run down indefinitely which is why the £17,000 lower limit is required. One way 
is to compare costs to the state and the individual over the six-year care cycle from the same initial 
starting positions in examples (a) and (b).  
How the proposed means test would fare against the preferred means test in these cases is shown 
in Table 5.  The same parameters are used for assets and income in both but £17,000 of assets are 
protected in the proposed case. The levels of support are seen to be very similar when compared 
over a six-year period shown in Table 3 and 4; however, an important difference is that in (a), the 
residential example, state support kicks in in the second year; in the preferred test support, it is year 
three. In the domiciliary case (b) the levels of support and costs to the individual are also similar; 
here, state support commences in the first year in the proposed formula and the third year in the 
preferred formula.   
In answer to the broader question of which is the cheaper system to the tax payer (as opposed to 
the fairer system), the differences appear to be slight if compared over a reasonable period, in this 
case six years.  However, it also depends on how long individuals are in care before they die. For 
example, if they die in the first years of care then the preferred formula is always cheaper for the 
state. However, a wider range of examples need to be tested using mortality tables for people with 
different care tariffs and hence different care needs, since such comparisons are not always 
straightforward due to technical complications of having exogenous capital limits.  
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Year in care 
(a) 
Residential 
care state 
support 
(£) 
(a) 
Cost to 
individual 
(£) 
 
(b) 
Domiciliary 
care state 
support 
(£) 
(b) 
Cost to 
individual 
(£) 
1 0 25,000 
 
1,136 16,864 
2 856 24,144 
 
2,564 15,436 
3 3,798 21,202 
 
3,694 14,306 
4 6,128 18,872 
 
4,590 13,410 
5 7,973 17,027 
 
5,299 12,701 
6 9,435 15,565 
 
5,861 12,139 
Final balance 28,190 121,810 
 
23,145 84,855 
 
Table 5: Levels of support delivered under the proposed formula applied to examples (a) and (b) in 
section 3.5 (Taper = 0.208) 
 
4. Interfacing means testing with care savings products 
The Dilnot Commission believed that a cap on care costs would result in a market for insurance 
products that would cover care costs up to the cap. To date this has not happened and in our 
opinion is unlikely to do so. Firstly the Government is equivocating on the cap and has delayed any 
final decisions until the next Parliament. Because the cap is set at a relatively high level the time to 
reach it is criticised as being too long. Secondly, and partly as a result, there are no indications that 
‘the private insurance market will develop as expected’. 19 The problem of developing a viable 
market for long-term care insurance has been a long-standing issue even before the Commission 
had started its work with very few policies sold.  This strongly implies that if no significant increase in 
state support is forthcoming and on the assumption that insurance solutions are unlikely to work, 
then other ways must be found to bring ‘new’ money into the system. 
Although the means test offers an important safety net as a funder of last resort, a key concern of 
this research is that it deters people from saving for care and so potentially crowds out new sources 
of finance.  It does this by creating the risk of a ‘moral hazard’ since people may choose to let the 
state cover their costs of care rather than provide for themselves (DEMOS, 2014).  One suggestion 
is to introduce hypothecated accredited care savings products whose aim would be to bring new 
money into the care system. The general principle is that all accredited care savings products 
should subject to incentives and financial reward to avoid or offset the means test trap.  In other 
words, it must pay people to save in this way. For this to happen, there needs to be stronger 
savings incentives that produce additional money rather than just substituting for state expenditure. 
Who would buy such products? The older population can be visualised as comprising three groups: 
(a) self-funders; (b) those that will rely almost wholly on state support; and (c) those in between that 
fall into ‘no-man’s land’. On reaching age 65+ for most people there should be little doubt into which 
they fall give or take the odd bequest or windfall.  A few may be tempted to buy insurance to cover 
their long term risks but at the moment there are no products on the market and the only products 
																																								 																				
19 This view is expressed in a letter by the then care minister, Alistair Burt, to the Chair of the Local Government Association on 17th July 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/446309/Cap_on_care_acc.pdf 
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that were available prior to the Care Act have been discontinued.  If the Government would like 
people to save more for their care, then they must be rewarded in some way.   
Self-funders do not, by definition, receive any state support and so saving more may make no 
difference to them as they would receive nothing anyway; those reliant on state support can do little 
to improve their position over time although they could save in small amounts. Those falling into no-
man’s land are in a quandary: Do they save or not? This group will typically own their own home, 
have above average pension income and above average savings. For the first period in care they 
will be self-funders but their home may be at risk if they are the only survivor and need to go into 
care or if their savings deplete sufficiently and they qualify for state support. 
There are several published examples of hypothecated care savings products. These include 
Personal Care Savings Bonds (PCSBs – Mayhew and Smith, 2014)20, accelerated life insurance 
products or disability linked annuities (see Mayhew and Smith, 2014; Mayhew et al, 2010). By this 
we mean authorised products which are triggered upon a care assessment or by some equivalent 
mechanism which is a condition of the policy or financial product (e.g. upon reaching a certain age). 
The idea is that the assets in these products would be disregarded for the purposes of means 
testing but subject to a limit. As a further possible inducement, its value would be ring fenced from 
inheritance tax if a person died without spending it all.    
 An alternative suggestion would be the creation a new legal mechanism which we call ‘care savings 
accounts’, through which people could set money aside specifically to cover the costs of care in 
later life.  The idea would be to commit portions of a person’s current wealth in the form of savings 
or housing equity or combinations thereof subject to a limit. The advantage of this is that it would 
enable people with mainly housing wealth to ring-fence some of that wealth before that wealth is 
bequeathed or spent.  A care account could be registered with the tax authorities, for example at 
state pension age, and could help slow the growth in state spending on care.   Again unused assets 
in the account could be treated as outside a person’s estate for inheritance tax purposes. 
Since financial products can be designed that provide either an income stream (such as an annuity) 
or a lump sum, means testing should be able to accommodate both without disadvantage.  The 
question is therefore what difference disregarding some or all of a person’s assets held in a care 
account would have on the wider care economy and how much the state and individual would each 
pay given that the state does not have an unlimited budget to pay for social care. Below, we develop 
two examples which are designed to tease out these issues and possible financial effects.  
(a) Person with protected capital in a care savings product 
Imagine a person with combined assets of £50,000 including £10,000 held in PCSBs. They receive 
domiciliary care for which the tariff is £18,000 including living costs. The bonds had been purchased 
regularly over a long period in small amounts and are now available to spend following a care 
assessment. There are two cases to consider: (i) the whole £50,000 counts towards assets for 
financial assessment purposes; or (ii) the £10,000 in PCSBs are disregarded as they have been 
designated as part of their personal care budget.  
																																								 																				
20 Personal Care Savings Bonds is a lottery-style savings product which works like National Savings Premium Bonds that pay out prizes but also 
accrue a low rate of interest.  
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The results, based on the preferred formula, are shown in Table 6. In case (i) initial assets are worth 
£50,000; the state pays £21,300 and the individual £86,700 over a six-year period as per example 
(b) earlier. In case (ii) the overall cost of care including living costs is unchanged but the state now 
pays £9,414 more and the individual £9,414 less. In case (i) this person would not receive any state 
support for the first two years, with the cost gap being effectively filled by the £10,000 in PCSBs 
which was therefore effectively saved in vain.  
In case (ii) they would be treated as if they had £10,000 less in assets; as a result  state expenditure 
starts from year two rather than year three. Since the ‘cost to individual’ column excludes the value 
of the bonds it means they will have £10,000 more to spend following a care assessment, plus 
£9,414 more in state support over a six-year cycle. Since the lower capital limit is dependent only on 
income and the tariff, it would remain at its previous value of £22,222.  If the person dies before six 
years the corresponding level of state support would reflect the shorter duration of care but the extra 
£10,000 available in savings would be unaffected. 
Does this mean there is more money in the system overall?  The answer is affirmative in terms of 
extra state support which can be considered as a ‘reward’ for saving for one’s care. Since PCSBs 
are triggered following a care needs assessment, it is likely that the money will also be ‘additional’ 
provided it hasn’t simply displaced other savings that had been spent down before the care 
assessment. Hence, the challenge should be to find mechanisms that encourage saving for this kind 
of product. Several areas of personal savings have already demonstrated this effect (e.g. tax free 
ISA accounts, other tax exemptions on savings deposits or dividends, and tax relief on pension 
contributions etc.).    
 
Year in 
care 
Cumulative 
care 
payments  
(£s) 
State 
support 
case (i) 
(£s) 
Cost to 
individual 
case (i) 
(£s) 
 
State 
support 
case (ii) 
(£s) 
Cost to 
individual 
case (ii)  
(£s) 
1 18,000 0 18,000 
 
0 18,000 
2 36,000 0 18,000 
 
3,600 14,400 
3 54,000 2,700 15,300 
 
5,580 12,420 
4 72,000 5,085 12,915 
 
6,669 11,331 
5 90,000 6,397 11,603 
 
7,268 10,732 
6 108,000 7,118 10,882 
 
7,597 10,403 
 
Final balance 21,300 86,700 
 
30,714 77,286 
 
Table 6: Impact on care funding and state support for a person with protected savings account:  
Case (i) without disregard; Case (ii) with disregard 
(b) Registered care account with 20 per cent disregard 
Let us imagine for example a situation in which the Government offered a one-off disregard for 
anyone with a care account.  If the Government offered a 20 per cent disregard to a person with 
£50,000 in their care account, then only £40,000 would count towards the means test and so on. 
Such a policy would be designed to reduce the moral hazard created by the means test, in that it 
would reward people for setting money or housing equity aside rather than treating this as a reason 
for the government to offer less support. 
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Table 7 provides an example of the difference this could make to out of pocket costs over a six year 
care cycle of a person with £50,000 in assets and £10,000 p.a. income. The disregard would only 
apply in the first year: Case (i) receives no disregard and case (ii) receives 20%, which means that 
only £40,000 rather than the full £50,000 is taken into account. The results show that both cases are 
entitled to some state support from the outset but it can be seen that out of pocket costs for case (ii) 
are  £69,122 on surviving six years as compared with £78,244 in case (i). 
The same questions apply to this idea as in the case of hypothecated savings products.  Although 
this example shows that the state could end up paying more there will be many other examples for 
which individuals could end up being self-funders especially in the first years of care and so the 
balance of costs could tilt away from the state as well as towards it. Again we believe this will 
depend on how care accounts are designed and operated. For example, there would almost 
certainly need to be an age limit (say, age 70) to prevent people from sheltering their assets at or 
just before the point of needing care. 
Year in 
care 
Cumulative 
care 
payments  
(£s) 
     State 
support 
case (i)  
(£s) 
Cost to 
individual 
case (i)  
(£s) 
 
State 
support 
case (ii) 
(£s) 
Cost to 
individual 
case (ii) 
(£s) 
1 25,000 8,333 16,667 
 
11,667 13,333 
2 50,000 10,556 14,444 
 
12,778 12,222 
3 75,000 12,037 12,963 
 
13,519 11,481 
4 100,000 13,025 11,975 
 
14,012 10,988 
5 125,000 13,683 11,317 
 
14,342 10,658 
6 150,000 14,122 10,878 
 
14,561 10,439 
  Final balance 71,756 78,244 
 
80,878 69,122 
	
Table 7: Impact on care funding and state support for a person with a registered account and a 20%  
disregard: Case (i) without disregard; Case (ii) with disregard 
 
5. Concluding reflections 
Means testing is needed because the actual costs of social care frequently exceed the levels that 
individuals can typically afford from their income. Means testing exists to limit the cost to the state 
by targeting public support on those with low incomes and savings and so means testing can be 
thought of as a mechanism for calibrating how much support is due and how much the state can 
afford. The Care Act (2014) resulted in a new method for calculating state support to replace the 
present system. The introduction of this method which includes a cap on care costs has since been 
postponed until 2020 on cost grounds and the purpose of this paper has been to use this 
postponement to review the operation of both the proposed formula and its predecessor i.e. the 
current means test. 
An analysis of the present and proposed formulae found faults with both and so a new formula, 
called the ‘preferred method’, was presented and analysed. It was noted that the proposed and 
preferred methods are actually part of a family of similarly constructed means tests based on the 
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concept of ‘affordable care years’ (see Annex A). These are defined as the years of care a person 
could afford to pay for from their own income and assets based on a system of tariffs for different 
packages of care.  
Using this concept the preferred system puts people  into five bands based on their eligibility for 
state support, A, B, C, D or E.  A receives the highest levels of support and E the least; those band 
greater than E receive nothing and so are ‘nil banded’. Under the preferred formula and faced with 
the same care tariff, they would receive the same level of state support as long as they had the 
same number of ‘affordable care years’. Under the proposed system, by contrast, a person with the 
same number of affordable care years would receive more favourable treatment if more of their 
wealth was in assets. These differences in the treatment of wealth make the preferred formula 
fairer. 
The proposed formula contains upper capital limit which is designed to protect the tax-payer. A 
problem with capital limits is that they introduce complexity and change behaviour, in this case by 
encouraging people to spend down or give away their assets in order to stay within them. In the 
proposed method a cut-off of £118,000 will restrict state funding to those with assets below this 
figure. In the preferred method, by contrast, the upper limit is different for each care tariff. Because it 
is not based on a single global value, it should discourage the early disposal assets since the tariff 
they receive will not be known in advance. For cost control purposes, we therefore believe a tariff 
system based on the care package and not an arbitrary upper limit is hence a better and more 
logical approach.  
The use of tariffs does raise the question of whether they should be set nationally or left to local 
discretion. We know that open ended commitments can lead to cost escalation as occurred in the 
early 1980s, leading to more controls being imposed. However, the Government is open to the idea 
after allowing local authorities to raise an extra 2% on Council Tax to pay for social care from 2016 
which could be used to cover local variations in care costs. Tariffs also require that living costs 
should be included and we simply note that the state benefit system provides a reference point for 
this purpose. If there was local discretion, it would need to be made clear how any difference 
between the national recommended and local tariff would be funded and if necessary voted upon in 
local elections. 
Another advantage of the preferred method over the proposed method was that it removed the need 
for a lower capital limit. This is because the preferred method has an in-built asymptotic mechanism 
for limiting asset depletion and thus protecting individuals.  A key feature is that instead of there 
being just one limit, a person’s ‘personal limit’ varied according to their income and the tariff. A 
variable limit was justified on the grounds of whether a person’s wealth was high in income or in 
assets and the degree of protection from the state that would be appropriate in individual cases.  
The formula for calculating limits was shown to be relatively simple and it would be straightforward 
to produce tables showing how long it would take to reach them e.g. in the form n years to reach x% 
of their value. 
One of the most controversial features of the proposed method is the £72,000 cap on care costs.  A 
cap is a limit on life time expenditure on care and is different from a lower capital limit which is a 
backstop to prevent further depletion of assets. Contributions towards the cap would be monitored 
by local authorities and therefore incur additional administrative costs which could be used on front 
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line care.  It was originally intended that the cap would enable insurance companies to offer 
products protecting people up to the value of the cap.  However, to date no products have emerged 
based on this feature and it is not difficult to see why.  Results presented here show that for a typical 
range of tariffs it could take years to reach the cap at the level set and so the insured person could 
be dead long before it is triggered.   
For the person contemplating buying such a product they would be wise first to undertake some 
financial crystal ball gazing. For a typical person with average savings or assets it is likely that they 
would reach their asymptotic capital limit before they reached the cap so that their actual loss 
exposure would be much less. For example, consider a person with initial assets of £50,000, an 
income of £10,000 and a tariff of £25,000 of which care costs are £12,000. Assuming they survived 
the six years needed to reach the cap, actual loss exposure over and above their income would only 
be £18,244 after taking state support into account. For a person with greater assets than this buying 
insurance could still make sense, but the problem of whether it would be value-for-money remains 
since it depends on whether they would have benefited from state support if had they died before 
the cap was reached.   
Hence, our main conclusion is that interactions between the cap and the means test cast doubt on 
whether the cap actually does what it was intended to do.21 Our preferred approach is to focus on 
the more important issue of bringing new money into the care system as part of a wider system of 
incentives e.g. should a person that takes out insurance be rewarded in some way such as through 
tax relief or ring fencing? The general principle is that the purchase of all accredited care savings 
products, insurance or otherwise, should be incentivised in some way to offset the means test trap.  
In addition, it should be possible to incorporate within the incentive structures different means of 
payment. These could range from pre-funded savings or annuities to payments made after death 
(e.g. based on the sale of fixed assets from person’s estate).  
In this research two illustrative mechanisms were proposed: one based on care-specific savings 
products such as PCSBs which would be disregarded for means testing purposes and another, 
which we termed ‘care savings accounts’, which ring-fenced a proportion of their assets until they 
were needed. In the first case the individual was rewarded by disregarding the savings worth up to 
£10,000 for means testing purposes and in the second case by disregarding the value of 20% of 
their assets.  By ring fencing those assets, the temptation to dispose of them is reduced in return for 
the prospect of more generous state support if care is needed plus protection from inheritance tax 
should that be necessary. 
 Both ideas are intended to open up a debate about how best to do this. Plainly there is wealth of 
possibilities and disregards could apply, say, to annuity income as well as to savings and so it is 
even more important that income and assets are treated fairly.  Because the public has shown little 
appetite for saving towards care or protecting itself against the costs, selling to this market has 
proved very difficult in the past. It means that although incentives are a necessary condition of 
success they may not be sufficient. In conclusion, because of the postponement of the proposed 
system until 2020, there is a window of opportunity to consider whether there is a better way to 
provide state support and encourage greater saving.    
																																								 																				
21 The Commission on Care and Support originally proposed a cap of £35,000  
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To conclude, this research has indentified several features of the proposed system which could be 
adjusted to improve its fairness and operation including the scrapping of limits and the cap. We 
already know that the reason for postponement of the proposed system was related to concerns 
over the cost to the public purse and that these concerns have not gone away.22 This suggests that, 
as well as revisiting the mean testing formula, steps should be taken to improve incentives to save 
for care and thereby bring new money into the care economy.  Hence, it is suggested that the 
Government and industry sets up a review of how best this can be done by considering and 
evaluating as many practical variants as possible. The package of changes needed could be seen 
as part of a ‘whole systems’ approach in which people are rewarded for saving for care in ways that 
would temper the growth of social care costs in a rapidly ageing population. It is hoped that the 
suggestions in this paper provide a suitable test bed to pursue these ideas.  
																																								 																				
22 Letter from Alistair Burt to the Local Government Association, 17th July 2015: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/446309/Cap_on_care_acc.pdf 
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ANNEX B: Asset depletion rates 
(a) Depletion of assets under the proposed formula 
Under	the	proposed	formula,	the	lower	capital	limit	currently	protects	assets	worth	£17,000.	It	can	be	shown	
that	assets	above	the	capital	lower	limit	deplete	at	the	rate	of	the	taper,	currently	0.208	or	£1	a	week	for	
every	£250	of	capital.	Their	value	in	year	 n 	is	given	by:	
1
1 )1(
−−= nn pAA 	
etcn ,....4,3,2,1= 	
As	 n 	increases,	 nA trends	to	zero.		To	see	how	it	works,	consider	a	person	with	£50,000	in	assets	with	care	
costs	of	£12,000	p.a.	of	which	£17,000	is	protected.		The	percentage	of	assets	remaining	at	end	of	year	6	
when	the	cap	would	be	reached	given	by %31792.0100)1(100 51 =×=−× −np 	where	 p equals	0.208.	This	
produces	0.31	x	(£50,000	-	£17,000)	=	£10,230.		The	retained	assets	would	therefore	be	worth	£10,283	+	
£17,000	=	£27,283	or	54.6%	of	the	original	savings.	
More	generally,	the	number	of	years	taken	to	deplete	assets	such	that	they	are	worth	 a 	as	a	proportion	of	
their	original	value	is	given	by		
1
)1ln(
ln
+
−
=
p
an 		
where	
1A
Aa n= .			
For	a	equal	to	0.5,	i.e.	50%	of	all	assets	above	the	lower	limit,	this	equates	to	3.97	years.	
(b) Depletion of assets under the preferred formula 
If	a	person’s	income	is	less	than	the	tariff,	assets	will	be	drawn	down	in	order	to	pay	for	care.	Under	the	
preferred	formula	there	is	an	automatic	lower	limit	below	which	assets	cannot	fall.	This	annex	derives	that	
limit	and	shows	that	it	depends	on	income	and	the	tariff	but	not	assets.	
Provided	that	income	does	not	exceed	the	tariff	and	that		 1<py 	state	support	is	given	by:	
TpyTS ×−−= )1( 	
This	simplifies	to		
TpyS = 	
Where	
y 	=	years	of	care	afforded	or	
IT
A
−
	
p 	 =	taper	
	37	
	
Starting	their	second	year	in	care	they	will	have	 I
IT
pTA +⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−11 	assets	remaining.			
Let	
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−=
IT
pTk 1 	
It	follows	that	the	assets	remaining	at	the	start	of	year	n	are	given	by:	
22101
1 .....
−− ++++= nnn IkIkIkIkkAA 			
For	 nn ,....4,3,2= 	
Where	 =1A Assets	at	the	start	of	the	first	year	
For	large	n	the	first	term	based	on	the	depletion	of	assets	reduces	to	zero.	The	sum	of	the	remaining	terms	
converges	to	a	constant	given	by:	
k
IAn −
=
1
		
In	other	words	under	the	preferred	method	assets	do	not	run	out	but	level	out	at	a	value	which	is	dependent	
on	income,	the	tariff	and	the	taper.	For	example	let	the	tariff	equal	£25,000	and	Income	£10,000	p.a.,	and	let	
p	the	taper	equal	0.2.	This	gives	k	=	0.6667	and	so	the	amount	of	assets	remaining	after	n	years	(for	n	large)	
is	£30,000	as	follows.		
000,30£
6667.01
000,10£
=
−
=nA 	
This	limit	changes	according	to	a	person’s	income	and	the	tariff.	
Let	L	be	the	limit	and	substituting	for	k	we	have	
⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−
=
)1(1
IT
pT
IL 	
)1(
T
I
p
I
−= 	
pT
I
pdI
dL 21
−= 	
L	is	a	maximum	when	 0=
dI
dL 	or	when		
2
1
=
T
I 	
That	is,	the	limit	is	a	maximum	when	income	equals	half	the	tariff.	If	starting	assets	are	less	than	£30,000	
they	will	remain	at	their	current	level	for	the	duration	of	care	so	assets	below	this	level	are	protected.	Based	
on	these	results,	if	income	is	£7,500	then	the	lower	limit	is	£26,250,	if	it	is	£12,500	or	half	the	tariff	it	is	
£31,250,	if	income	is	£15,000	it	is	£30,000. 
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